CHOICE OF LAW IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: USE OF
STATE OR FEDERAL LAW TO DETERMINE FOREIGN
CORPORATION'S AMENABILITY TO SUIT

IN

THE quarter-century that has elapsed since the Supreme
Court's decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins' the federal courts have
struggled incessantly with the problem of placing definitive limits
on the application of the Erie doctrine in a variety of areas.2
Particular difficulty has been encountered in attempting to decide
whether state or federal rules of law should obtain in matters which
conceptually might be classified with equal logic as either substantive or procedural. In passing upon a foreign corporate defendant's
objections to personal jurisdiction, for example, a federal district
court is initially confronted with the question whether a state or
federal standard is to be employed in determining whether the
corporation is "doing business" 3 in the jurisdiction so as to make
it amenable to suit there. 4 The disposition accorded this prelimi1304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie decision requires the federal courts to apply the
substantive law of the state in which the court is sitting whenever state created
rights are being adjudicated, regardless of whether such law has been fashioned by
statutory or judicial pronouncement. In those matters encompassed by the rubric
"procedural," federal rules apply.
2For a chronological discussion of Supreme Court decisions dealing with post-Erie
problems see IA MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.306 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
MOORE].

'The term "doing business" is "simply a shorthand label describing judicial and
statutory tests used to determine different legal consequences of a corporation's ties,
contacts or relations with other states." CAPLIN, DOING BUSINESS IN OTHER STATES III
(1959). "Doing business" as used in this comment refers to those activities in a
state which render a corporation amenable to service of process. Other legal consequences which turn upon a determination as to whether a foreign corporation is
"doing business" in a state include the state's ability to tax the corporation and to
exact from it compliance with state qualification requirements. Activities which are
sufficient to subject a corporation to service of process may not be extensive enough
to permit taxation of the corporation or require it to qualify in the state as a condition to the lawful conduct of such activities. See generally CAPLIN, op. cit. supra at
III-VII; I CCH CORP. L. GUIDE
1000-19; 23 CORP. J. 163 (1961). For a synopsis of
"doing business" tests in the various states for each of these areas see CAPUIN, op. Cit.
supra.
'In contesting its amenability to suit a foreign corporation may also challenge
the propriety of venue in the district. This comment, however, will consider only
the jurisdictional aspects of amenability, since there is virtual unanimity of opinion
to the effect that a federal court should employ federal law in determining whether
a foreign corporate defendant's activities in the district are sufficient to constitute
"doing business" for venue purposes. See, e.g., Paragon Oil Co. v. Panama Ref. &
Petrochem. Co., 192 F. Supp. 259, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Rensing v. Turner Aviation
Corp., 166 F. Supp. 790, 795 (N.D. Ill. 1958); Remington Rand, Inc. v. Knapp-
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nary inquiry is, in essence, a classification of "doing business" standards as either substantive or procedural for Erie purposes, and is of
particular significance in those cases wherein jurisdiction of the
court is posited upon diversity of citizenship of the parties. 5
The inadequacy and difficulty of application characterizing the
substantive-procedural dichotomy adopted in Erie have provoked
several attempts by the Supreme Court to clarify its intent in this
area. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York" the Court propounded the
so-called "outcome-determinative" test for use in deciding whether
Monarch Co., 189 F. Supp. 613, 617 (E.D. Pa. 1956); 1 BARRON 9- HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 179, at 697 (1960) [hereinafter cited as BARRON & HOLTZorF];
0.142 [5.-3], at 1499; 67 YALE L.J. 1094, 1099 n.18 (1958). Indeed the
1 MOORE
federal venue statute embodies the very term "doing business" as the criterion to
be used in determining whether suit in the district is proper when the corporation is
neither incorporated nor licensed to do business in the jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §
1391 (c) (1958). This fact alone may be indicative of a congressional intent that the
federal courts fashion an independent federal standard of "doing business" for use in
applying the venue statute. 5 DUKE B.J. 129, 184 (1956).
GThe issue of which "doing business" standard to apply also arises with some
frequency in federal question cases, but its importance in this context is overshadowed by the magnitude of the controversy in diversity cases. By the great
weight of authority, it is clear that the federal standard should be applied in cases
wherein vindication of substantial federally-created rights is sought. See, e.g.,
Goldberg v. Mutual Readers League, 195 F. Supp. 778, 781 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Singleton
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 20 F.R.D. 15, 17 (E.D. Mich. 1956); 1 BARRON &
HOLTZOFF § 179, at 696. But see Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219, 228 n.9 (2d Cir.
1963). This view is not confined solely to those actions denominated as federal
question cases, and a mere allegation of diversity will not preclude a federal court
from applying the federal standard where a substantial federal question is involved.
See, e.g., Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 212 F.2d 147, 154 (5th
Cir. 1954); First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 735
(E.D. Tenn. 1962). Although seldom discussed by the courts, it would seem that
jurisdiction obtained over a corporation through use of the federal standard in such
cases is complete, giving a court power to adjudicate pendant state created claims.
First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., supra at 735. This would certainly
be in keeping with the policy of conserving judicial resources which underlies the
concept of pendant jurisdiction. On the subject of pendant jurisdiction, see generally, Note, 62 CoLumn. L. REv. 1018 (1962). In a related and somewhat analogous
situation, a line of authority has recently developed to the effect that extra-territorial
service of process on a defendant pursuant to a federal statute containing a "long-arm"
provision gives a district court jurisdiction over the defendant to adjudicate pendant
non-federal claims. Schwartz v. Eaton, 264 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1959); Townsend Corp.
of America v. Davidson, 222 F. Supp. 1 (D.N.J. 1963). Contra, International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union v. Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
With regard to removed cases, it is well established that the "doing business"
standard of the state in whose courts the action was commenced should be employed
in reviewing a foreign corporation's objections to personal jurisdiction, since the
removal jurisdiction exercised by the federal courts is essentially derivative in nature.
See, e.g., Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, Inc., 165 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1948); Stimler v,
Yoshida Shoji Co., 195 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Ultra Sucro Co. v. Illinois Water
Treatment Co., 146 F. Supp. 393, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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to apply state or federal rules of law in any given situation, regardless of whether such rules had traditionally been classified as substantive or procedural. The Court pointed out that the objective
of Erie was to insure substantial uniformity of result within the
forum state whenever state created rights are being adjudicated.
It concluded, therefore, that where such rights are being adjudicated
in the federal courts solely because of the diversity of citizenship of
the parties, the court should give effect to any state rule of law the
derogation of which would substantially affect the outcome of the
7
litigation.
Following the Guaranty Trust decision, one of the most important questions became that of how far this modified Erie compulsion would be extended in contravention of the policy of insuring
procedural uniformity among the federal courts exemplified by
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 Applied
in extremis, the "outcome-determinative" approach would result
in relegation of the federal courts to a position of almost complete
subservience to state law whenever state created rights are being
litigated, since outcome affecting arguments can be advanced with
regard to practically any rule of law which may be invoked during
the course of litigation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's decision
in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op.9 has been interpreted by
some writers and lower federal courts' ° as a commendable effort to
place restraint upon unduly rigid application of the "outcomedeterminative" approach through use of an "interest-weighing" test.
Such a test would entail a two step inquiry involving more than
mere outcome considerations. Recognition of state rules of law
in the federal courts would be conditioned upon their reflection of
significant state interests which not only would be subverted by
the application of federal law, but which outweigh any relevant
7

Id. at 109.
8See Note, 37 IND. L.J. 352, 354 (1962). Indeed the whole question of the relation between the Erie doctrine and the federal rules, thrust almost simultaneously
upon the federal courts in the year 1938, has been the subject of considerable discussion. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, TtE FEDERAL COURTS AND TH1E FEDERAL SYSTEM
674 (1953); Clark, The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules, 24 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y
158 (1941).
- 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
lOE.g., Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 1960); Jaftex Corp.
v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 513 (2d Cir. 1960); Vestal, Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins: A Projection, 48 IowA L. REv. 248, 268 (1963); The Supreme Court, 1957
Term, 72 HARV. L. Rav. 77, 147 (1958).
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federal interests.'1 Criticism of the Byrd case has been equally
as enthusiastic, 12 however, particularly in view of the equivocal
language used by the Court in the opinion 13 and the far-reaching
4
effect ascribed to the decision by many of the lower courts.'
This then is the present status of the Erie doctrine, within the
context of which the federal courts must resolve the question
whether a state or federal "doing business" standard is to be utilized
for jurisdictional purposes in ordinary diversity cases.
]Zn comparing state and federal law in the "doing business" context, it should be noted that one important distinction exists. State
service of process provisions indicating the circumstances under
which foreign corporations will become amenable to the personal
jurisdiction of the state's courts normally include the term "doing
business" or "transacting business" as one of the criteria resulting
':'In the Byrd case the Court held that plaintiff in a diversity action based upon
a state-created right was entitled to a jury determination of a factual issue raised by
defendant's affirmative defense in accordance with federal practice, notwithstanding
a South Carolina practice assigning such determinations to the presiding judge. The
Court recognized the obligation of the federal courts under the Erie and Guaranty
Trust Co. decisions to "conform as near as may be" to state rules of law bearing
substantially upon the outcome of the litigation where state-created rights are being
adjudicated, but went on to assert that where such rules are not "bound up with
the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties" and where there are
"affirmative countervailing considerations" present, the federal courts may be justified
in departing from state law. The Court viewed the South Carolina rule as "merely
a form and mode of enforcing" the state-created right in question, and found in the
independent nature of the federal judiciary and the influence of the seventh amendment a countervailing federal policy sufficient to require vitiation of the state rule in
the federal courts. 356 U.S. at 536-37.
12 See generally Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution (pts. 1 & 2), 53
Nw. U.L. REv. 427, 541, 604-07, 609 (1958); Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's.
Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 TUL. L. REv. 443 (1962). The
principal exception taken to Byrd by these writers is the Court's failure to meet the
constitutional issue implicit in the decision, namely whether the Constitution requires
the Erie result. If the Erie doctrine is based upon constitutional considerations then
it would seem that the Byrd "interest-weighing" approach is improper except in
those cases involving a federal practice of clear constitutional origin.
"After considering the role of state law in the federal courts and recommending
what could be construed as a sweeping departure from the "outcome-determinative"
approach, see note 11 supra, the Court noted in the closing paragraphs of its opinion
that the outcome of the case under consideration would probably not be altered by
the application of federal law. 356 U.S. at 539-40. This equivocation by the Court
obviously served to weaken the impact of the decision upon the existing body of
precedent which it sought to streamline. See Smith, supra note 12, at 449.
I"See cases discussed in Smith, supra note 12, at 454-65. Most of the writers
commenting on Byrd have recognized the desirability of limiting its application.
See 43 MINN. L. REv. 580 (1959) (application of Byrd in contravention of Erie
doctrine limited to cases involving dearly defined federal policies); 28 U. CINc. L.
Rv. 390 (1959) (Byrd not regarded as modification of Erie doctrine, but rather an
exception to it in the narrow area of distribution of judge-jury functions).
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in such amenability.'5 These provisions provide a basis for judicial
interpretation culminating in a "doing business" standard. On the
other hand, there is no federal statute or rule of general application
addressing itself to the question of when a foreign corporation becomes amenable to the personal jurisdiction of the federal courts.' 6
To fill this interstice the federal courts have apparently adopted
the "minimum contacts" concept advanced by the Supreme Court
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington

business" standard.'

7

as a federal "doing

Adoption of the International Shoe test by

"See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 193 (1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 110, § 17 (1956);
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 302; TEX. Rv. Civ. STAT. tit. 42, art. 2031 b (Supp. 1963). Use
of the term "transacting business" in the more modern statutes apparently reflects a
desire to extend the state's jurisdiction over foreign corporations to the constitutionally
permissible limit, and it has been held that less activity is required to constitute
"transacting business" than that required for "doing business." Haas v. Fancher
Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
"0See Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 1963). This absence of
federal legislative guidance was deemed quite significant by Judge Friendly, leading
him to question the very existence of a federal "doing business" standard which could
be used by the federal courts in diversity cases to the exclusion of state law on the
point. Id. at 226-28.
The suggestion has been advanced that Congress might dispel the existing confusion in this area by supplying a uniform federal "doing business" standard, thus
in effect defining "doing business" as procedural for Erie purposes. 102 U. PA. L. Rv.
415, 417 (1954). See also 67 YALE L.J. 1094, 1105 (1958) (in matters not clearly
procedural, federal courts should apply state law when adjudicating state-created
rights absent congressional intervention). But see Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills,
Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 515-16 (2d Cir. 1960).
"1326 U.S. 310 (1945).
' 8 Sce, e.g., Houston Fearless Corp. v. Teter, 318 F.2d 822, 825 (10th Cir. 1963);
Goldberg v. Mutual Readers League, 195 F. Supp. 778, 781-82 (E.D. Pa. 1961); K.
Shapiro, Inc. v. New York Cent. R.R., 152 F. Supp. 722, 725 (E.D. Mich. 1957); 74
HARv. L. Rav. 1662, 1663 (1961); 69 HARv. L. Rv. 508, 514 n.56 (1956).
It should be noted that this action by the federal courts is somewhat anomalous,
since the decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 17, did not
purport to be productive of a federal "doing business" standard, but rather was an
attempt to define the limit to which a state may extend its jurisdiction over foreign
corporations consistent with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
See 69 HARV. L. REV. 508, 515 (1956); 7 ViLL. L. Rav. 117, 119 (1956).
One possible explanation for the deference given to International Shoe by the
courts in this respect is that the constitutional proscriptions set forth there may be
binding on the federal courts under the fifth amendment due process clause. See
Woodworkers Tool Works v. Byrne, 191 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 1951).
While it is well settled that federal law controls venue in the federal courts, see
note 4 supra, the question of whether or not this same standard may be applied
for venue purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (c) (1958), is a matter of considerable
dispute. Compare Remington Rand, Inc. v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 139 F. Supp. 613,
618-19 (E.D. Pa. 1956), with Paragon Oil Co. v. Panama Ref. & Petrochem. Co., 192
F. Supp. 259, 261-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The contention has been advanced that use of
the same "doing business" standard for venue and jurisdiction would restrict the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, since a defect in venue would automatically result
in a lack of personal jurisdiction and thus prevent transfer of the case to a district
where venue would be proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (a) (1958). 67 YALE L.J. 1094,
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the federal courts for jurisdictional purposes has, of course, rendered
academic the question of which "doing business" standard should
be applied in those states which have reacted to InternationalShoe
by extending the jurisdiction of their own courts over foreign
corporations to this constitutionally permissible limit. 10 It is only
when the state standard is more restrictive than it must be, that
controversy ensues.
Those courts employing a state "doing business" standard base
their decision to that effect either on the premise that the Erie
principle requires such a result, 20 or on an interpretation of the
federal service of process provisions which incorporates into rule
4 (d) (7), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 the forum state's concept of what constitutes "doing business" for jurisdictional purposes.2 2 Courts relying on the latter rationale generally apply the
federal standard in those cases where service of process has been
effected under rule 4 (d) (3),23 in effect treating the two provisions as
independent, alternative means of asserting jurisdiction over a
1099 n.18 (1958). This contention loses its validity, however, in light of the Supreme
Court's recent holding in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 869 U.S. 463 (1962), 1963
DuKE L.J. 168, allowing transfer under § 1406 (a) by a court lacking personal jurisdiction.
" See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219, 235 (2d Cir. 1963) (dissenting
opinion); K. Shapiro, Inc. v. New York Cent. R.R., supra note 18, at 725. The trend
among the states is definitely in the direction of expanding their jurisdiction over
foreign corporations. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction,
73 HARV. L. Riv. 909, 919-33 (1960); Note, 44 IowA L. REV. 361 (1959). See also note
15 supra.
20 See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. UPI, supra note 19, at 226-27; Smartt v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Corp., 318 F.2d 447, 448 (6th Cir. 1963); Green v. Robertshaw-Fulton Controls
Co., 204 F. Supp. 117, 127 (S.D. Ind. 1962); Rensing v. Turner Aviation Corp., 166
F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ill. 1958); Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 838,
847-49 (S.D. Cal. 1955); 30 IND. L.J. 324, 330-31 (1955).
"1 FED. R. Crv. P. 4 (d) (3) provides that service of process shall be made "upon a
... foreign corporation... by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint
to an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized
by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy
to the defendant."
FED. R. Crv. P. 4 (d) (7) provides as follows: "Upon a defendant of any class referred
to in paragraph ... (3) of this subdivision of this rule, it is also sufficient if the
summons and complaint are served in the manner prescribed by... the law of the
state in which the district court is held for the service of summons or other like
process upon any such defendant in an action brought in the courts of general
jurisdiction of that state."
22 See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219, 242
(2d Cir. 1963) (appendix to dissenting opinion); Stanga v. McCormick Shipping Corp., 268 F.2d 544, 548 (5th Cir.
1959); Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193, 194 (1st Cir. 1948); 30
IND. L.J. 324, 330 (1955).
"3See note 21 supra.
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defendant.2 4 The better view, however, would seem to be that
these provisions provide only for the more mechanical aspects of
service of process, rather than containing by inference, differing
indicia as to when a defendant becomes amenable to such service. 25
Courts applying a state standard because of the Erie principle
are probably on much firmer ground. In light of Erie and its
progeny, the proper preliminary inquiry for a court to make in
determining whether to give effect to a state "doing business" standard would seem to be whether that standard reflects significant state
interests 26 which would be subverted by use of the federal standard.
If, for example, a state has declined to extend its jurisdiction over
foreign corporations to the constitutionally permissible limit in
an attempt to encourage limited, exploratory activity in the state by
such corporations, 27 then recognition of the state's more restrictive
21 Compare Walker v. General Features Corp., 319 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1963)
(service under rule 4 (d) (7), state standard applied), with Houston Fearless Corp. v.
Teter, 318 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1963) (service under rule 4(d) (3), federal standard
applied). In a state which employs a more restrictive "doing business" standard than
the federal test, this distinction may cause the question whether a foreign corporation
is amenable to suit in the federal courts there to turn on the illogical criterion of
which of the two applicable service of process provisions is utilized.
2r See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219, 225-26
(2d Cir. 1963); 5 DuKE B.J.
129, 131-32 (1956).
20 This may be an extremely difficult determination for the federal courts to make
on any basis other than conjecture, since state court decisions in the "doing business"
area are typically silent as to the policy factors influencing their opinions. On occasion, judicial decisions or manifestations of legislative intent do evince a state
interest of considered merit which should be recognized by the federal courts. See
note 27 infra. On the other hand, such indicia may serve to emphasize the absence
of any state interest implicit in the "doing business" standard adopted. See note 29
infra. Where no such guidelines are available, however, it is submitted that no
determination should be attempted by the federal courts, and that a restrictive state
"doing business" standard should be presumed grounded upon a significant state
policy.
27 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 99,
2 (1953), provides that "a foreign
corporation shall not be considered to be transacting business..." in a state, "for
the purposes of this Act, by reason of carrying on..." in the state "any one or more
... " of certain enumerated corporate activities, such as holding shareholder or
directors meetings, maintaining bank accounts, selling through independent contractors and conducting isolated transactions. (Emphasis added.) This section has
been enacted in substance in a number of jurisdictions, see 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr
ANN. § 99, 1 2.01, at 556 (1960), and while the draftsmen of the model act intended
it to apply only for qualification purposes, see id. § 99,
4, at 565-66, it is clear that
several states have utilized it to exempt foreign corporations from service of process
where they are engaged only in the specified activities.
In Connecticut the above italicized portion of the provision, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-397(b) (1960), is particularly significant, since the chapter dealing with stock
corporations contains the state's entire service of process scheme with regard to
foreign stock corporations. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-411 (1960). A prior reference
to foreign corporations in the state's general service of process provisions was deleted
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On the other hand, if the

state standard is merely an outmoded expression of what the state
considers to be the limit to which it can extend its jurisdiction over
foreign corporations consistent with due process, 29 or an attempt to
by a 1961 amendment, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-59a (Supp. 1962), and a pair of
recent decisions have iecognized a legislative intent to immunize from amenability
to suit in the state those foreign corporations engaged only in one or more of the
activities enumerated in § 33-397(b). Powell v. Sealectro, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 6, 8
(D. Conn. 1962); Southern New England Distrib. Corp. v. Berkeley Fin. Corp., 30
F.R.D. 43, 48 (D. Conn. 1962). Compare Connecticut Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Bowsteel
Distribs., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 290, 190 A.2d 236 (Conn. C.P. 1963) (foreign corporation engaged in non-enumerated activity in state not allowed immunity because of
conduct of enumerated activity). The comparable Iowa provision, IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 496A.103 (1962), and the Maryland provision, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 84(b)
(1951) (now art. 23, § 88 (b) (1957)), have been similarly construed. Hill v. Electronics
Corp. of America, 253 Iowa 581, 113 N.W.2d 313 (1962); Compania De Astral, S.A. v.
Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 258, 107 A.2d 357, 366 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
943 (1955).
In Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 1963), the suggestion is made that
"state statutes determining what foreign corporations may be sued, for what, and
by whom, are not mere whimsy; like most legislation they represent a balancing of
various considerations-for example, affording a forum for wrongs connected with
the state and conveniencing resident plaintiffs, while avoiding the discouragement of
activity within the state by foreign corporations."
See also ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS § 1303 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963), providing that service of process issuing
from a district court in diversity cases "shall have binding effect upon any party
only to the extent that the law of the state in which the district court is held
proscribes in like actions brought in its courts of general jurisdiction." In the
commentary to § 1303, at 55, the draftsmen indicate that "federal power ought not
to be available as a matter of course to bring before a federal court in a diversity
action parties beyond the reach of state process whenever it is thought tactically
desirable to do so."
28 Cf. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1962), where
the court held that the New York rule regarding the patient-physician privilege
should govern in the federal courts there in diversity cases, stating that "the privilege
reflects a legislatively determined state policy. It is designed to encourage confidential
communications between persons in [that] relationship... by protecting these communications from compulsion to reveal them. The rule of privilege is unlike the
ordinary rules of practice which refer to the processes of litigation, in that it affects
private conduct before litigation arises.... The patient-physician privilege is more
than a rule of procedure since it goes to relationships established and maintained
outside the area of litigation, and 'affect[s] people's conduct at the stage of primary
private activity and should therefore be classified as substantive or quasi-substantive.'"
Id. at 466.
29Even where the application of state law is clearly demanded, the federal courts
are not bound by state precedent which would no longer be followed by the courts
of the state in question. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198,
209-12 (1956).
Thus where state precedent indicates restraint in the "doing
business" area because of due process limitations no longer in effect or erroneously
conceived, the federal courts quite properly feel no compulsion to be bound thereby.
See, e.g., Westcott-Alexander, Inc. v. Dailey, 264 F.2d 853, 859 (4th Cir. 1959). Similarly, where state judicial expression concerning "doing business" antedates legislative
developments indicating a desire to expand the state's jurisdiction over foreign
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control crowded dockets in its own courts by restricting their jurisdiction, 30 then application of a more liberal standard to permit the

federal courts to take jurisdiction would in no way impugn state
policy.
Even assuming, however, that the restrictive state standard in
question is based upon a significant state policy which would be
subverted by federal assertion of jurisdiction through use of the
federal standard, the two-pronged "interest-weighing" test adopted
in the Byrd case would seem to require further that the state policy
involved outweigh any relevant federal policies. Relying on the
Byrd case, at least one federal court has found new impetus to
apply the federal standard in all diversity cases. In Jaftex Corp.
v. Randolph Mills, Inc.31 Judge Clark asserted that there is a countervailing federal policy of assuring to those litigants who properly
invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts the essentials of a trial
according to uniform federal standards. Moreover, he felt that the
independence and integrity of the federal judicial system would be

undermined if state law were allowed to control access to the federal
courts.

32

corporations, the federal courts may again disregard the obsolete state precedent.
See, e.g., Stanga v. McCormick Shipping Corp., 268 F.2d 544, 550 (5th Cir. 1959).
30 See 47 CORNELL L.Q. 286, 293 (1962); 74 HARV. L. Rav. 1662, 1664 (1961).
3- 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960). Prior to Jaftex, there was very little authority
for the proposition that the federal standard should be applied in all diversity cases.
Broad statements to this effect by some courts were usually explicable in terms of
a distinction drawn by the court between subdivisions (3)and (7) of FED. R. Civ. P.
4 (d). See, e.g., Nash-Ringel, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 524, 525-27
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). In K. Shapiro, Inc. v. New York Cent. R.R., 152 F. Supp. 722, 725
(E.D. Mich. 1957), the court held without qualification that federal courts should
employ the federal standard in all diversity cases, citing as authority a per curiam
opinion of the Supreme Court in Riverbank Labs. v. Hardwood Prods. Corp., 350
U.S. 1003, reversing 220 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1955). Shapiro has been sharply criticized,
however, because of the inconclusive nature of the Supreme Court decision relied
upon as controlling authority. See, e.g., Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The
Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 211-12
n.120 (1957); 67 YAL.E L.J. 1094, 1097-98 (1958).
Jaftex has been religiously followed, however, in subsequent district court decisions in the Second Circuit. E.g., Winchester Electronics Corp. v. General Prods.
Corp., 198 F. Supp. 355 (D. Conn. 1961); Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 26 F.R.D. 589
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
3.282 F.2d at 513. Although Jaftex was expressly overruled by the Second Circuit
en banc in Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 1963), Judge Clark's position
was reaffirmed in a vigorous dissent to that decision. It should be noted, however,
that reference was made in that dissent to the familiar distinction drawn between
subdivisions (3)and (7) of FED. R. Cav. P. 4 (d), id. at 240, 242, indicating a partial
retreat by Judge Clark from his unequivocal position in Jaftex that "the question
whether a foreign corporation is present in a district to permit of service of process
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In essence, then, use of the Byrd "interest-weighing" approach in
this context has accentuated the basic controversy between Erie and
the policy considerations underlying diversity jurisdiction. The
Erie doctrine is premised upon the assumption that it is desirable,
if not constitutionally mandatory, that effect be given to legitimate
state rules of law in the federal courts whenever state-created rights
are being adjudicated. Diversity jurisdiction, on the other hand,
was provided for the purpose of preventing discrimination against
foreign litigants, 33 and its proponents insist that all federal citizens
should be entitled to invoke certain minimum procedural standards
through use of the federal courts in appropriate cases. The Supreme
Court has not yet ruled on the question whether this is a proper
application of the Byrd test, or, in fact, on the propriety of the
alternative treatment mentioned above which many courts accord
sections (3) and (7) of federal rule 4 (d). The fate of restrictive,
policy-reflecting state "doing business" standards in the federal
courts can be definitively determined only by such a decision.
The Court has decided, however, that effect should be given to
state "door-closing" statutes in the federal courts. In Angel v.
Bullington34 and Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.35 the Court held
that constitutionally valid state statutes abolishing a state-created
cause of action or limiting capacity to sue in the state courts would
preclude use of the federal courts in the state by diversity litigants
to circumvent such statutes. Some courts have seen in these sanctions of state law an indication that binding effect should also be
given to state "doing business" standards in the federal courts. 3 It
has been suggested with perhaps equal cogency, however, that
capacity to sue and existence of a substantive cause of action should
8
not be equated with jurisdictional criteria. 7
upon it is one of federal law governing the procedure of the United States courts
and is to be determined accordingly." 282 F.2d at 516.
"See generally Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 22-28 (1948); Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction,
41 HARV. L. Rav. 483 (1928).
Concerning the contemporary utility of diversity jurisdiction, see Doub, An Old
Problem: The FederalDiversity Jurisdiction, 45 A.B.A.J. 1273 (1959). Compare Marbury, Why Should We Limit Federal Diversity Jurisdiction?,46 A.B.AJ. 379 (1960),
with Meador, A New Approach to Limiting Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 A.B.A.J. 383
(1960).
'a 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
337 U.S. 535 (1949).
(2d Cir. 1963); Lone Star
" See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219, 227
Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 212 F.2d 147, 153 n.4 (5th Cir. 1954).
37 See 56 COLUM. L. REv. 394, 399 (1956); 5 DUKE B.J. 129, 134-36 (1956).
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The fact remains that considerable confusion persists with regard
to whether a state or federal "doing business" standard should be
employed by the federal courts for jurisdictional purposes in diversity cases. While many of the courts considering the problem
still rely on dubious distinctions between the two relevant service
of process provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it appears that reliance upon the Byrd doctrine as a basis for applying
the federal standard, in contradistinction to the view that Erie requires use of a state standard, has for the first time put the issue in
a suitable posture for a meaningful Supreme Court decision. In
light of the trend established by the Court's holdings in Angel v.
Bullington and Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. and the questionable
extent to which the Byrd case may be relied upon as a comprehensive
modification of Erie8 it seems probable that the Court would determine that restrictive state "doing business" standards should be
adhered to by the federal courts in diversity cases insofar as they
actually or presumptively represent the implementation of legitimate state policies8 9 which would be adversely affected by federal
assertion of jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
See notes 12-14 supra.
"See note 26 supra.

